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INMATE UNIONS: AN APPRAISAL OF PRISONER RIGHTS
AND LABOR IMPLICATIONS
SIDNEY ZONN*

The author discusses recent decisions concerning
prisoners' rights, and examines the arguments for and
against allowing inmates to organize unions.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Correctional officials traditionally have been vested by the
courts with all the trappings of a government inside the prison walls.
Administrative,' legislative,2 and judicial actions3 were exclusively
delegated to the prison official's control. Under these circumstances
a correctional facility incorporated all the characteristics of a "total
institution ' 4 dominating every aspect of a prisoner's being; provid* Member, University of Miami Law Review.
1. Administrative features entail the regulation by correctional authorities of all aspects
of the inmates' day to day existence. This includes the standard of living, nature of work
performed and wages received, if any. See E. GovvmA, On The Characteristicsof Total
Institutions, ASYLUMS (1961).
2. Prisoner conduct is controlled by the enactment of rules designed to curb any form of
disruptive institutional behavior. Curfews, dress and grooming standards are among the
various methods of control that are used. See E. GoMAN, supra note 1.
3. Correctional officials determine to a large extent any distinction between administrative and judicial terminology in evaluating the circumstances under which an inmate may
be subjected to the internal judicial process of trial and punishment. See E. GOFFMAN, supra
note 1.
4. In defining five groupings of total institutions, one category is interpreted as protecting the community at large from intentional dangers to it. Specific examples in this grouping
include jails, penitentiaries, prisoner of war camps, and concentration camps. In this context,
the welfare of the individual in the institution is not an immediate issue.
The "total institution" can exist only where the environment possesses the following
attributes: 1) a single authority with a single organization designed to fulfill official aims; 2)
all aspects of life continuing in the same place with large groups of individuals treated alike;
3) extensive amounts of scheduling and regulation; 4) large numbers of people supervised by
a relatively small staff; 5) supervision of conduct which is so pervasive that conduct at one
place and time can be used by the staff to control conduct elsewhere; and 6) only minimum
opportunity for privacy, property, or family. See E. GoFFMA, supra note 1.
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ing, in a sense, an Orwellian existence for each individual confined.
This form of confinement did not go unnoticed. By a variety of
means, inmates, commentators and courts, joined to voice their
increasing displeasure with the system.5 As a result, a movement for
prisoner rights developed which has made substantial progress in
the areas of religious freedom,' racial equality7 and court access.'
From these initial victories the struggle to obtain additional
rights sought new avenues and forms of expression. Perhaps the
most unusual, and by far the most controversial, has been the evolution from individual to organized action, that is, concerted activity
through the inmate union. The inmate union provides a broad spectrum of services, functioning not only as a means for correctional
reform, but also as a labor organization seeking higher wages, better
working conditions and recognition as a collective bargaining agent.,
With this dual role, the inmate union is at once powerful, yet vulnerable since it poses a threat, in the view of correctional administrators, to the stability of the entire penal system.
The continued vitality of these unique organizations is now
threatened due to the recent Supreme Court decision of Jones v.
North CarolinaPrisoners'Labor Union, Inc. 'oThe Court, in refusing
to extend the cloak of constitutional protection to this form of union
under the first amendment," may have halted in its infancy any
trend to continue inmate unions. The thrust of this comment, therefore, will be to review the growth and development of inmate unions
and to explore the probable repercussions of Jones in this area of
prisoner rights and union organization.
5. See generally Singer, Prison Conditions: An Unconstitutional Roadblock to
Rehabilitation, 20 CATm. U.L. REv. 365 (1971); Hirschkop & Milleman, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795 (1969); Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts:
A Critiqueof JudicialRefusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963);
57 VA. L. REv. 841 (1971).
6. E.g., Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).
7. E.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
8. E.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
9. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoner's Union, 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977); Comment, Labor
Unions for PrisonInmates: An Analysis of a Recent Proposalfor the Organizationof Inmate
Labor, 21 BtFFo L. REv. 963 (1972); Comment, The First Amendment Behind Bars: Prisoners Right to Form a "Union", 8 PAC. L.J. 121 (1977).
10. 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977).
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
11. "Congress shall make no law ...
or the right of people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
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II.

A.

PRISONER RIGHTS

The Hands-Off Doctrine

In the criminal justice system, constitutional guarantees have
in the past been important up to and including conviction. Beyond
that, however, the convicted individual faced a no-mans' land of
virtually arbitrary and unsupervised discretion on the part of those
who might be termed his "keepers." The prisoner had as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all of his
personal rights except those which the law in its humanity may have
accorded him. Throughout
his incarceration, he is treated as a
"slave of the state.""2 Though more than a century old, no more apt
description has detailed his predicament.
It is this philosophy which has thoroughly permeated the
correctional structure and has been dubbed the "hands-off" doctrine.'" Under this view, review of internal operations by courts was
flatly refused without explanation.' 4 The basis of the doctrine has
been found intermittently to rest on judicial restraint, judicial abstention, or judicial abdication where prison matters are concerned. 5 The practical effect of this policy has removed correctional
officials from any form of judicial accountability. Thus, once an
individual was legally convicted, the doctrine operated to place his
grievances beyond the scope of judicial review.
The arguments advanced in support of a hands-off approach
are three-fold. The first rationale entails a constitutional analysis,
suggesting that concerns of federalism require that state executive
functions in this area be free from federal judicial interference."
Next, is the concept of financial nonaccountability, meaning that
courts can neither appropriate funds for prisons nor interfere with
their allocation.' 7 A final basis for the doctrine is that the importance of maintaining order requires adherence to disciplinary stan-

dards which can only be achieved through unhampered administrative discretion.' 8
12. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
13. The hands-off doctrine is attributed to a 1961 Federal Bureau of Prisons document,
Fitch, Civil Rights of Prison Inmates (1961), cited in Comment, Beyond the Ken of the
Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J.
506, 506 n.4 (1963).
14. See Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954).
15. G. HAWKINS, THE PIUsoN 136 (1976).
16. E.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (federal habeas corpus relief unavailable to state prison inmate where relief sought would infringe upon the state's power to
administer its correctional institutions).
17. E.g., Padgett v. Stein, 406 F. Supp. 287 (M.D. Pa. 1975).

18. E.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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The Wane of Hands-Off

Judicial attitude towards intervention on behalf of prisoner
grievances was altered by a series of Supreme Court decisions in the
1960's. Police and prosecutorial conduct began to be carefully scrutinized where the rights of prisoners might be prejudiced; as a consequence, violation of these rights resulted in judicial interference and
subsequent enforcement.'" A basis for this judicial intervention was
found in the Civil Rights Act of 187150 which provides a federal
forum for aggrieved parties regardless of whether state remedies had
first been exhausted. 2 Furthermore, the Supreme Court expressly
recognized the right of state prisoners to the protection of the Civil
Rights Act when they brought their complaints to the attention of
a federal court.2 "
The transition from judicial restraint to judicial activism occurred despite the widespread belief that the structure of prison
society demanded the enactment of special rules and restrictions
not otherwise applicable in a free society. As inmates became more
sensitive to violation of their constitutional rights during all stages
of their post-conviction and incarceration, it became increasingly
apparent that involvement by both the judiciary and the legal profession was an essential ingredient to prison reform. A further incentive for judicial activism was the development of a highly politicized
prison population which included anti-war protestors and civil
rights activists."
The combination of judicial activism, legal involvement and
prisoner unity helped to define the constitutional boundaries of prisoner rights and attempted to reorganize the power structure in prisons." Needless to say, however, the movement for rights had its
19. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
See R. GOLwviAR, JALs 349 (1975). The modern approach to prisoner rights has its roots in
an earlier Sixth Circuit case where the court stated: "A prisoner retains all the rights of an
ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law."
Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).

21. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
22. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964). It should be pointed out, however, that the
liberal decisions of the Warren Court in areas of civil rights and liberties generally did not

extend to the area of correctional reform. Two noteworthy decisions which deal with correctional problems, however, are Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) ("jailhouse lawyers"
allowed to assist inmates for post-conviction relief where they were without adequate legal
assistance) and Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (due process requirements must be
applied in a probation revocation proceeding).
23. 'S.CHANELES, THE OPEN PwSON (1973).
24. Chief Justice Warren Burger, an outspoken advocate of increased attention towards
the entire correctional process, has been a prime motivating force in admonishing the organized bar to assume greater responsibility in this area. His position is that grievances can be

1978]

AN APPRAISAL OF PRISONER RIGHTS

accompanying martyrs and rallying points. Bloodshed, such as that
which resulted at Attica, is well remembered by those on both sides
of prison walls. 5 Less remembered, however, are the demands,
which in retrospect seem relatively inoffensive: rehabilitation programs for all inmates tailored to their offenses and individual needs,
modernized inmate education programs, expanded work release,
adequate medical treatment, an end to censorship of newspapers,
and freedom to communicate with the outside world at inmate expense."6
The advancement of prisoner rights received its earliest impetus in the form of religious freedom27 which, in large part, was due
to the diligent efforts of the Black Muslims. Since then, the right
to conduct religious services has been extended to Buddhists. 8 In
3
addition, Orthodox Jewish dietary laws 9 and grooming standards
have been permitted notwithstanding contrary prison regulations
which provide: "There will be no limitations on hair style and length
of hair but beards will be prohibited. . . . Mustaches, defined as
hair growing on the upper lip, are permitted. Beards are not permitted since they most readily compromise security because of the

consequent rapid modification of appearance.' '131 As a corollary to
the recognition of a prisoner's right to effectively practice a religious
adequately adjusted through open channels of communication between inmates and correctional officials. He analogized to the labor field:
With proper grievance procedures in a large industrial operation, the hour-to-hour.
and day-to-day frictions and tensions of employees can be carried up through
channels and either guided to a proper solution or dissipated by exposure. This,
in essence, is what every penal institution must have-the means of having complaints reach decision-making sources through established channels so that valid
grievances can be remedied and spurious grievances exposed.
Burger, Our Options are Limited, 18 VILL. L. REV. 165, 170 (1972); Chief Justice Burger Issues
Yearend Report, 62 A.B.A.J. 189, 190 (1976); See also Pollack & Smith, Courts as a Vehicle
for Prison Reform, 56 JUDICATuaE 413 (1973).
25. For a detailed look at the roots of inmate unrest and the underlying cause of prison
disturbance and riots, see Fox, Why Prisoners Riot, 35 FED. PROB. 9 (1971); Martinson,
Collective Behavior at Attica, 36 FED. PROB. 3 (Sept. 1972). Both authors agree that the
primary causes of riots are bad food, unsanitary living conditions, oppressive discipline and
staff intransigence.
26. G. HAWKINS, THE PRIsoN 76 (1976). Even in the fundamental areas of food and
medical care, courts have been very hesitant to tamper with the discretion of correctional
officials. See Hughes v. Turner, 14 Utah 2d 128, 378 P.2d 888 (1963); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
27. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961);
Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
28. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
29. Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975).
30. Moskowitz v. Wilkerson, 432 F. Supp. 947 (D. Conn. 1977). See also Burgin v.
Henderson, 536 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1976).
31. 432 F. Supp. at 948 n.1.
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preference, this period saw a removal of many of the racial barriers
and discriminatory policies prevalent throughout the penal sys3
tem ..1
Another important inroad in the "hands-off" doctrine has been
the establishment of a right of access to the courts so that inmates
may petition the government for a redress of grievances. In Bounds
v. Smith, 33 the Supreme Court held that access to the courts was a
fundamental constitutional right. In order to preserve this right, the
Court required prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers. Furthermore, to pass
constitutional muster, either adequate law libraries or competent
assistance from inmates trained in the law must be provided.
A further expansion of the rights afforded prisoners can be
found in the area of health services. Under the eighth amendment,
the government has been required to provide a full complement of
medical care to those whom it incarcerates.3 4 As part of this duty,
defective equipment and haphazard procedures must be rectified so
as to equal those general standards established in the medical pro3
fession. 1
The extent to which a prisoner retains the right to send and
receive mail, free of official censorship, has posed a more complex
set of questions in determining the breadth of prisoners' rights. The
methodology employed by the Court in confronting these issues can
best be characterized as circuitous. In Procunierv. Martinez,3" the
Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to define the
parameters of a prisoner's first amendment right to receive mail free
from censorship. Instead, the decision was based on the first amendment right of an outside correspondent, thus providing inmates with
only an indirect protection from official censorship. The twopronged test promulgated by the Court evaluated: (1) whether the
regulation furthered legitimate governmental interests of security,
order and rehabilitation; and (2) was it no broader than necessary
to accomplish that purpose. 7 Unless the test of Procunier is complied with, there can be no censorship of incoming mail. 38 Under this
32. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir.
1968).
33. 97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977). See Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971), aff'g sub nom.
Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969);
Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
34. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
35. Todaro v. Ward, 431 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
36. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
37. Id. at 413.
38. Blue v. Hogan, 553 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1977) (magazines advocating prison unionism);
Thibodeaux v. South Dakota, 553 F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1977) (prison officials must show need
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standard, however, any improper censorship would not be a violation of the inmates' rights, but rather the outside correspondent's.
This may be a roundabout way of accomplishing the same end since
in most instances the inmate receives his mail untouched.
While there have been important advances in the prisoner
rights movement,39 corresponding limitations have also developed
which govern against abuse. The expression of religious practices or
beliefs is not boundless and may be curtailed if a threat to prison
discipline or security is posed. 0 Moreover, the religion or sect must
constitute an actual belief both sincere and bona fide. In Theriault
v. Silber,41 the district court held that the Church of New Song
(CONS), a sect envisioned, developed, and implemented by prisoners, was not a religion within the scope of the first amendment, and
consequently not entitled to constitutional protection. According to
the court, CONS simply provided an expeditious avenue through
which members attempted to gain extra privileges and avoid individual sanction because of their proclaimed religious status.,
Perhaps a more significant deprivation is the continuing nonexistence of a notion of privacy inside a correctional institution.,3 Inmates cannot assert an immunity from searches and seizures of their
persons or their personal property. As stated by the Supreme Court
in Lanza v. New York, "[Ilt is obvious that a jail shares none of
the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a
hotel room . . . .[O]fficial surveillance has traditionally been the
order of the day."44
Although inmates have been able to express themselves
through written communications,45 they have been prohibited from
initiating face to face communications with the press." This prohibition rests on the proposition that the inmate already has considerfor censorship of sex magazines addressed to inmates); Cofone v. Manson, 409 F. Supp. 1033
(D. Conn. 1976) (first amendment will not permit censorship regulations to be wholly discretionary). See Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970) (prison officials prohibited from confiscating all but hard core pornography and highly inflammatory material based
on publisher's first amendment rights).
39. See text accompanying notes 27-38 supra.
40. Sharp v. Sigler, 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969); Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964); Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971).
41. 391 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Tex. 1975).
42. See text accompanying note 77 infra.
43. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom., Oswald v.
Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
44. 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).
45. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
46. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843
(1974).
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able access to outside sources to depict and describe conditions
found within the institution.47 Therefore, the challenged prison regulations could not be said to infringe on the inmates' first amendment rights. Furthermore, it was contended that press interviews
with specific inmates would increase their status and enhance their
ability as a potentially disruptive force in the prison community.,8
By virtue of their status as convicts, further limitations have
been imposed on prisoners and former prisoners. For example, no
constitutional violation has been found in excluding convicted felons from the voting franchise," barring convicted felons from holding union office unless pardoned or in receipt of a good conduct
certificate " and restricting parolees from associating with certain
persons categorized as undesirables. 5 '
III.

A.

UNION ORGANIZATION

The Labor Movement

A brief review of American labor history suggests that unionism's dramatic growth resulted from the business and economic
conditions of the twentieth century.52 Surveying the period of greatest upheaval, the Depression, the need for a new labor policy directed at alleviating the imbalance between strong and intransigent
employers and fledgling unions became apparent. Congress responded in 1935 by enacting the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), 53 a bill that endorsed the right of workers to organize and
47. 417 U.S. at 824. The Court noted that "alternative means" of communication available to the inmates range from written correspondence to visiting privileges with family
members, friends of long standing, their attorneys, and the clergy. According to this reasoning, visiting privileges provide ample opportunity to furnish information to the press through
these varied sources. Id. at 824-25.
48. This particular characterization has been labelled the "big wheel phenomena" in a
dissenting opinion by Justice Powell in which Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred.
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 866 (1974). Notoriety through press exposure
would threaten security, impair discipline, and hamper the ability for rehabilitation.
49. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974); Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117
(M.D.N.C. 1972), aff'd, 441 U.S. 961 (1973); Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.
Fla.), aff'd, 396 U.S. 12 (1969).
50. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960). But see Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945)
(where a state statute which forbade issuance of a license to union business agents convicted
of a felony was held repugnant to National Labor Relations Act).
51. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (dictum). See also Arciniega v. Freeman,
404 U.S. 4 (1971).
52. See generally Barbash, The Labor Movement After World War II, 99 MON. LAB. REV.
34 (Nov. 1976); Bernstein, Public Policy and the American Worker 1933-1945, 99 MoN. LAB.
REV. 11 (Oct. 1976); Taft, Expansion of Unionizationin the Early 20th Century, 99 MON. LAB.
REV. 32 (Sept. 1976).
53. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
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collectively bargain with their employers.54 Following the end of
World War II, labor asserted its new-found strength in constant
strike activity. As a result, additional legislation was adopted to
reduce concerted activity by the union membership.55 This legislation, the Labor Management Relations Act,5" was esentially a Republican attempt to balance the NLRA restrictions on management
by imposing similar ones on unions.57
By the 1960's, labor's major strides in unionism were focused
on the public sector. This development reflected, and was perhaps
dependent- upon, the expanding role of state and local government
as an employer. Thus, unionism's most recent development derived from the same social force that gave the labor movement its
impetus during the Depression: the changing public interest.5 9 In
this context, one might well suggest that the acceptance, and hence
survival, of inmate unions will depend upon whether the public
interest now extends to them.
B.

Inmate Organization

Inmate organization had its origin at California's Soledad
Prison. 0 The movement then spread to Folsom Prison where nearly
2,000 inmates participated in a seventeen day prison strike in November 1970.61 The success of the Folsom strike and the consternation
which it caused correctional officials, instilled prisoners with an
added incentive to establish a prisoners' union. The United Prisoners' Union " found a common organizing tack by combining labor
issues with prisoner rights claims.63 To effectuate common aims,
54. The statutory language is as follows: "Employees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .....
55. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935) (amended 1947).
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-68, 171-82, 185-87 (1970).
57. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(1)-(7) (1970).
58. See Barbash, supra note 52, at 37.
59. Id.
60. Seidman, The Prisonerand the Union, THE NATION, July 5, 1971, at 6-7.
61. Browning, OrganizingBehind Bars, RAMPARTS, Feb. 1972, at 40-45.
62. Id.
63. A strong emphasis was placed 'on the disproportionate status of the inmate worker,
his pay and working conditions. In 1971 for instance, the average prison wage in California
ranged from $.02 to $.16 an hour. The union. promised to seek implementation of the minimum wage and workmen's compensation benefits for those incarcerated. The United Prisoners Union declared the inmates' no win predicament in their opening statement:
Half a man's life is made up of the time he devotes to labor. . . . Work is the
major provision of a people. If we do not work we steal. If we steal, the chances
are we will be returned to prison. If we can't find work in a system that does not
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inmates felt it essential to construct their own internal organization.
With the power that accompanied such an organization, no longer
did power continue to reside exclusively with official authority. A
strong internal organization became the lynchpin from which power
emanated; without it concessions granted could easily be withdrawn
by the authorities."
Advocates of an organization of inmates as a tool for the furtherance of legitimate inmate grievances view this effort in terms of
a classic labor conflict: employer against employee, institution
against inmate. By definition, however, the analogy is not so easily
drawn as the inmate has never been considered an "employee"
within either the meaning of the NLRA, 5 or state statutes."
Even without the statutory authority of the existing labor relations structure, the organizing effort still has considerable constitutional support under the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of
association. The advances of the last two decades had led those
connected with the elevation of inmate rights to believe that assoprovide jobs for everybody, we are sometimes returned to prisons with a parole
violation.
We as members of the convicted working class are twisted and mangled in
the vise of a cruel system that cares little for human life. We are the last to be
hired, the first to be fired. . . .In the widening class struggle in Amerika (sic),
we prisoners are the lowest of the low. We are wage slaves inside and outside ...
Browning, Organizing Behind Bars, RAMPARTS, Feb. 1972, at 40, 44.
Payment of substandard wages may force defendants to seek forms of public assistance
and welfare and place inmates in a position without any financial resources when released.
As a result, the incentive to work is removed since the wage system does not adequately
provide a responsible means for supporting either the inmate or his family.
Those proposing change indicate that payment of regular wages could provide both
incentive and responsibility that is lacking. Further, it would enable prisoners to pay taxes,
reimburse the state for room and board and provide financial support for their dependents.
The implementation of such a structure has been urged as a positive step towards reintegration into society. Comment, Minimum Wages for Prisoners:Legal Obstacles and Suggested
Reform, 7 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 193 (1973); R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 631
(1973); ABA JOINT COMMITTEE ON LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS, The Legal Status of Prisoners
(1977 Tent. Draft); Standard 4.1-4.4 and Commentary, represented in Am. CaM. L. REv. 377,
458-65 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
64. See notes 52-60 supra and accompanying text.
65. "Employee" must be defined in context with "employer." To fit within the category
of an employee one must be in the service of an employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (Supp.
1975). However, the term "employer" does not include "any State or political subdivision."
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970), as amended (Supp. V 1975). The interrelation of these two definitions removes the inmate from the purview of the Act.
66. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 447.203(3)(f) (Supp. 1976) (which states: " 'Public employee'
means any person employed by a public employer except: Those persons who have been
convicted of a crime and are inmates confined to institutions within the states"). See also
FLA. STAT. § 944.49(5) (Supp. 1976) (which states: "No prisoner compensated under this
section shall be considered as an employee of the state . . .nor shall such prisoner come
within any other provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act."); CAL. PENAL CODE § § 2700,
2766, 2791 (West Cum. Supp. 1970) (amended 1976).
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ciational freedom was also a protected right. Consequently, organizational efforts occurred in a number of states all over the country. "7
Generally, the inmate union combines the characteristics of an
organization seeking the expansion of prisoner rights with the traditional goals of a labor union seeking a bargaining status on wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. " Since it
transcends the traditional union by incorporating social, economic,
and sometimes political goals, the inmate union may be considered
a sophisticated hybrid with a broad based approach to a variety of
inmate problems. This approach is rooted in the state of confinement which encompasses every aspect of the inmates' existence. 9
Therefore, wages and working conditions 0 can constitute only one
area of potential reform. Thus, to be truly effective, a union must
look beyond labor issues to the remainder of the inmate's fundamental concerns such as his living conditions and his personal requirements.
Several theoretical justifications have been offered for the acceptance of the inmate union as a method of resolving differences
between inmates and administration. Sharing the power with inmate leadership could be a constructive form of allocating responsibility and preventing large scale disturbances, of which riots have
been the predominant form.7 ' By granting an inmate organization
a degree of representation and control, equilibrium could be introduced into the system, and tension could be reduced among the
inmates.72 Moreover, official recognition of the inmate union would
furnish an extrajudicial forum for dispute resolution and result in a
corresponding savings of judicial time and taxpayers' money. Most
important of all, the inmate union would give the inmate a share of
self-determination, as he would become cognizant of the responsibility delegated to him and aware of the ramifications of his own
67. The most comprehensive efforts took place in California, Georgia, Kansas, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, D.C. and
Vermont. The eventual disposition of these efforts was not nearly as successful. See Huff,
Unionization Behind the Walls, 12 CRIM. 175 (1974); Survey, note 129 infra.
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. 1975).
69. See note 4 supra.
70. For consideration of application of the minimum wage and workmen's compensation
benefits to inmates, see ABA STANDARDS 4.1-4.6 and Commentary, supra note 62, at 193;
Comment, Minimum Wages for Prisoners:Legal Obstacles and Suggested Reform, 7 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 193 (1973); Comment, Unionizing America's Prisons-Arbitrationand State-Use,
48 IND. L.J. 493 (1973).
71. Fox, Why PrisonersRiot, 35 FED. PROS. 9, 13 (March 1971). Contra, P. REMICK, IN
CONSTANT FEAR (1975).

72. Comment, Labor Unions for Prison Inmates: An Analysis of a Recent Proposalfor
the Organizationof Inmate Labor, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 963, 978-82 (1972).
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actions and those of his fellow inmates. This involvement in the
decision-making process would have a rehabilitative effect as it
would provide the inmate with an opportunity to make choices analogous to those he would be required to make outside of prison.73
In contrast to the justifications for the inmate union are the
practical realities of its operation inside the prison system. To the
correctional bureaucracy, the idea of inmate unions is contradictory
to penological objectives. Support by prison officials of inmate
unionization would indicate their assent to the idea of a community
of rights, a concept at odds with the traditional view of punishment
for crime.74 There is, therefore, little incentive for authorities, who
have no legal obligation to do so," 5 to agree to any significant dealings with inmates.
If there are faults with the existing prison power structure dominated by the prison authorities, why develop a countervailing
power base containing all the inherent deficiencies of the first? The
creation of an inmate union, while creating a power balance, would
prove counterproductive to its purpose of increasing communication
between the parties. Rather than resulting in increased interaction,
opposing groups in the prison community would only become more
alienated.76 Notwithstanding the opportunity for positive change
unionization offers, it also creates the opportunity for concentration
of power in the hands of inmates who could utilize the organization
for corrupt purposes. At the same time these inmates would be able
to insulate themselves from harm through their status as union
officials.77
73. Note, Bargaining in CorrectionalInstitutions: Restructuring the Relation between
the Inmate and the PrisonAuthorities, 81 YALE L.J. 726 (1972).
74. J. MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT 296 (1973).
75. See text accompanying notes 88-91 infra.
76. T. MURTON, THE DILEMMA OF PRISON REFORM 175 (1976). Murton's conception of the
disruptive nature of the inmate union is all the more important because he is critical of
present prison policies and seeks a substantial effort toward prison reform. He does not view
the union as a curative, but as just another symptom of the correctional system disease. The
escalation of force to meet force does not, in his opinion, attack the underlying inadequacies
of the system; rather, it simply clouds them. Id. at 175.
77. This is precisely the experience as related by inmate Peter Remick of Walpole State

Prison, Massachusetts. His book INCONSTANT FEAR (1975) traces the organization and imple.
mentation of a union, the National Prisoners Reform Association (NPRA) at Walpole, during
1972 and 1973. The NPRA replaced its predecessor Inmate Counsel and thereafter promoted
such illicit activities as the distribution of drugs, prostitution, protection, and the elimination
of inmates who opposed or criticized its policies. Id. at 68-69.
Remick's account details a potentially good idea gone sour. The initial NPRA election

was held by secret ballot conducted by the National Center for Dispute Settlement of the
American Arbitration Association and was certified as fair by inmate representatives and
guards designated by the prison administration and other state departments. Although the
procedures followed were proper, the representation elections were falsified beforehand. Id.
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The apprehension on the part of the citizenry to the development of unionism in both the public and private sectors must also
be considered. Prison officials have been able to take advantage of
this in their opposition to inmate unions. Cltlng the special considerations in effectively running a prison, they argue that the inherently antagonistic relationship between administrators and inmates
creates an even more inappropriate atmosphere for unionization
than exists in the public sector. Under this viewpoint, the possible
threat to the security of the public institution a fortiori precludes
union organization." Finally, they argue that the alleged stability
which has built up over the years in the public and private sectors
may have no relevance to the issue of the utility of inmate unions. 9
IV.

JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT OF INMATE UNIONS

The brief history of inmate organizing activity has been replete
with attempts to secure bargaining status with official authority *
While some prisoner rights claims have reached the United States
Supreme Court for ultimate resolution,8 the union issue has received differing and often evasive interpretation by lower federal
courts. In Goodwin v. Oswald,8" the Prisoners' Labor Union at
Greenhaven challenged a prison seizure of letters concerning the
formation and certification of the union. The information had been
compiled and furnished by the Legal Aid Society. Although delivery
of the mail was ordered, the court avoided ruling on the legality of
inmate unions or prison organization.
at 61. Hard core offenders gained control of the NPRA and transformed it into a profitable
business for their personal advantage and a shield to ward off sanctions by the correctional
authorities: "The idea of the prison reform, at least in NPRA terms, isn't for real reform-it's
to antagonize the guards." Id. at 65.
Although Remick's account is an expose of only one inmate union, it presents a graphic
account of actual abuses of inmate unionization.
78. For a discussion of how prison security may be promoted by inmate unidns see
Comment, The First Amendment Behind Bars: Prisoners' Right to Form a "Union", 8 PAc.
L.J. 121, 134-36 (1977).
79. See Comment, Labor Unions for PrisonInmates: An Analysis of a Recent Proposal
for the Organizationof Inmate Labor, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 963, 972 (1972); Note, Bargaining
in CorrectionalInstitutions: Restructuring the Relation Between the Inmates and the Prison
Authority, 81 YALE L.J. 726, 754-57 (1972).
80. See, e.g., Sprouse v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc., 480 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1973); Sims v.
Parke Davis Co., 334 F. Supp. 774, aff'd, 453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
978 (1972).
81. See text accompanying notes 27-38 supra.
82. 462 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1972). The Prisoners' Labor Union at Greenhaven was never
recognized by correctional officials as a bargaining representative or spokesman for the inmates. Id. at 1239.
83. Judge Oakes, however, in a concurring opinion analyzed the recognized deficiencies
of a penal system that could foster prisoner unrest and concluded that some form of inmate
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Prior to 1977 only two district court opinions had confronted the
associational rights of prisoners to organize. In National Prisoners
Reform Association v. Sharkey, 4 inmates of the Adult Correctional
Institution of Rhode Island challenged a prohibition against organizational meetings issued by the Assistant Director of Corrections of
the Rhode Island Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services.
Earlier meetings had been conducted in the presence and with the
approval of the warden and other supervisory personnel. These
meetings had concentrated on the Association's goals to improve
prison conditions'and inform the community of existing conditions.
The district court enjoined the Assistant Director from proscribing
the associational meetings. The court required the state to carry the
burden of establishing that its regulations furthered a substantial
governmental interest 5 and that the restriction on first amendment
freedoms was no greater than necessary to protect that interest. 6
The state had failed to show that any threat of violence, breach of
security, or even an increased security workload would result. Thus,
the court stated: "Prisons do not exist outside the law. They are
institutions created by law and prison officials are subject to law.
The discretion vested in these officials is always subject to the limits
imposed by the Constitution."87
Two years. later in Paka v. Manson,8 a federal district court
again faced the issue of a prisoner union. 8 Paka had basically the
same factual background as did Sharkey, but included certain aggravating circumstances which weighed heavily in the court's decision.1 The court found that, although correspondence between a
prisoner and his attorney may be protected, inmates did not have a
union should be given the opportunity to rectify legitimate inmate grievances: "There is
nothing in federal or state constitutional or statutory law .. .that forbids prison inmates
from seeking to form ...an organization or agency or representative group of inmates
concerned with prison conditions and inmates' grievances." 462 F.2d at 1245.
84. 347 F. Supp. 1234 (D.R.I. 1972).
85. Id. at 1238. See United States v,O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
86. 347 F. Supp. at 1238.
87. Id. at 1240.
88. 387 F. Supp. 111 (D. Conn. 1974).
89. The prisoners did not seek to establish a labor union. They only wanted to form an
organized group with elected representatives to meet with prison administrators to discuss
grievances and to propose institutional changes. 387 F. Supp. 111, 115 (D. Conn. 1974).
90. The aggravating circumstances which weighed heavily in favor of the State's interest
involved a letter written by Weusi Paka, a leading inmate organizer, which was addressed to
the local chapter of the NAACP. It described a fictitious, violent incident occurring after the
date on which the letter came into possession of prison officials. This tactic not only could
have undermined the administration of the institution, but also could have posed a definite
threat to internal order by creating additional friction between inmates and correctional
officials. Id. at 113. It also put into serious doubt whether the organization could responsibly
handle authority and decision-making power. Id. at 123, n.19.
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protected first amendment right to form a union.9 The Supreme
Court decision of Pell v. Procunier" provided guidance in that it
evaluated alternative means of communication when balancing first
amendment rights against legitimate governmental interests. 3 In
applying this analysis, the Paka court reasoned that there were
various administrative avenues for individual inmates to communicate their grievances to prison officials-either through the prison
chain of command, the correctional ombudsman,9 4 or the Prison
Association. 5 In view of these alternatives, the abridgement of the
right to organize was considered minimal when compared to the
state's interest in the security of its prisons. The conclusions drawn
by the Paka court indicate that there are segments of our society
which, due to a seemingly justified need for stricter governmental
supervision, will not enjoy as broad first amendment protections as
the rest of society.
V.

JONES v. NORTH CAROLINA PRISONERS' LABOR UNION

Six years passed from the inception of the first prisoners' union
at Folsom Prison until the first Supreme Court decision squarely
facing the issue of the associational rights of inmates. In Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union," the North Carolina Department of Correction enacted regulations that had a devastating
effect on the union. First, they forbade inmate solicitation of other
inmates to join the union. Next, they did not permit inmates to
conduct union meetings. Finally, the regulations prohibited delivery
of all union publications mailed in bulk to inmates who received
them for redistribution to the remainder of the inmate population. 7
The union instituted a civil rights action 9 attacking these policies by alleging violations of the first and fourteenth amendment
rights of its members. The district court opinion found constitutional violations by prison authorities for failure to allow inmate
solicitation for union membership, meeting privileges, and refusing
91. 387 F. Supp. 111, 123 (D. Conn. 1974).
92. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
93. Id. at 824.
94. The correctional ombudsman functions as a go-between for the inmates. The relative
merits or deficiencies of these individuals are beyond the scope of this Comment. For a nation
by nation treatment of this subject see W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS'
PRoTEcTiON INNINE COUNTRIES (1966). For a discussion of a state plan, see Note, The Correc-

tions Ombudsmen-A Legislative Note in the Ohio Plan, 3 CAP. U.L. REV. 77 (1974).
95. 387 F. Supp. at 117-18. The Prison Association is a statewide group interested in
penology.
96. 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977).
97. Id. at 2536.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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receipt of the union publications. 9
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and upheld the challenged regulations.' °° Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
developed an approach incorporating much of the rationale of Pell
v. Procunier."I Applying the Pell'°2 test, the court reached a similar
conclusion to that reached in Paka v. Manson;'°" the guarantee of
first amendment associational rights must yield to the reasonable
considerations of correctional management in the continued security of the penal system. As stated by Justice Rehnquist:
The interest in preserving order and authority in the prisons is
self-evident. Prison life, and relations between the inmates themselves and between the inmates and prison officials or staff, contain the ever-present potential for violent confrontation and conflagration. . . . The case of a prisoners' union, where the focus
is on the presentation of grievances to, and encouragement of
adversary relations with, institution officials surely would rank
high on anyone's list of potential trouble spots. . . . When
weighed against the First Amendment rights asserted, these institutional reasons are sufficiently weighty to prevail.0"
The majority apparently chose to ignore a variety of tests applied previously by other courts when confronting the same or similar issues, such as a clear and present danger test, compelling state
interest test and a least restrictive alternative test.'0 Instead, the
Court applied the less exacting standard' 6 of a rational basis test.
In response, Justices Marshall and Brennan pointed out in dissent
that many rules and regulations imposed on students and citizens
by school and city officials, though "rational," do not outweigh the
first amendment rights of these individuals. In their view, the test
for prison officials should be no different "simply because prisons
are involved."'0 7 The dissent succinctly elaborated the eventual re99. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union v. Jones, 409 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
100. 97 S. Ct. at 2538.
101. 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (prison regulation allowing media representatives to interview
random inmates and refusing permission for inmates to initiate interviews held constitutional).
102. See notes 46-48 & accompanying text supra.
103. 387 F. Supp. 111 (D. Conn. 1974).
104. 97 S. Ct. at 2542 (citation omitted).
105. See Comment, The First Amendment Behind Bars: Prisoners' Right to Form a
"Union", 8 PAc. L.J. 121, 129-32 (1977).
106. 97 S. Ct. at 2541. The rational basis test requires only a minimal showing on behalf
of the administration that their actions are reasonable under the circumstances. The conclusion on the part of the administrators that inmate organizations or unions pose a likelihood
of disruption to the prison community is enough to satisfy the test and permit associational
restrictions.
107. 97 S. Ct. at 2546.
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sult of continued application of this standard:
If the mode of analysis adopted in today's decision were to be
generally followed, prisoners eventually would be stripped of all
constitutional rights, and would retain only those privileges that
prison officials, in their "informed discretion," designed [sic] to
recognize. The sole constitutional constraint on prison officials
would be a requirement that they act rationally.'8
In addition to the first amendment challenge, the inmates asserted a fourteenth amendment claim alleging a denial of equal
protection. This was based upon the prison policy of extending bulk
mailing and meeting privileges to the Jaycees, Alcoholics Anonymous, and the Boy Scouts while denying them to the union. The
Court rejected this claim, holding that a prison was not a "public
forum" which entitled any and all organizations to equal treatment.' °0 In the Court's view, it was within the particular expertise
of correctional administrators to determine which groups exhibited
the most potential to aid the inmates socially, spiritually, or even
politically. Thus, the correctional administrators need.simply demonstrate a rational basis"' for the distinction applied to different
organizational groups to satisfy the requisites of equal protection.
The alleged adversary nature of the union and its coexistence with
the administration is therefore enough to justify different treatment.'"
The Court further reinforced its new standard by shifting the
burden of proof as to which party must demonstrate the existence
or nonexistence of a threat to security. According to the Court, "the
burden was not on appellants [Department of Correction] to show
affirmatively that the Union would be 'detrimental to proper penological objectives' or would constitute a 'present danger to security
and order,'" but rather on the union to show the prison officials
have exaggerated their response.' This statement indicates that it
is up to the inmates to make a showing that the union does not
endanger the security or stability of correctional facilities. Prior to
this pronouncement, the burden had been on correctional officials
to demonstrate that actual tension existed and that the limitations
108. Id. at 2549 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 2542-44. Cf. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military installation, which
allowed civilian entertainers and speakers to perform while refusing political candidates a
right to speak and disseminate campaign literature, did not violate equal protection or convert the base into public forum).
110. 97 S. Ct. at 2543.
111. Cf. City of Charlotte v. Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283 (1976).
112. 97 S. Ct. at 2539.
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imposed were not exaggerated responses to imaginary concerns.3
As a result of this holding, the inmates, the union, or any other
related organizations are confronted with a paradox since they are
unable to demonstrate the responsibility and reliability of an organization unless they are first given an opportunity to organize, something which correctional regulations may permissibly prohibit. This
shifting burden, if applied to all prison rules, will virtually eliminate
any challenge by prisoners as to the deprivation of their rights under
the Constitution.
As Chief Justice Burger noted in his concurring opinion, the
decision does not address the relative merits or deficiencies of the
inmate union, but only whether such an organization has the constitutional right to exist in a prison society."' Thus, according to the
Chief Justice, the lack of this protection does not signal an automatic end to the union as the prison officials may in their discretion
still permit inmate unions. '
Regardless of how the opinion is approached, its inevitable and
ultimate outcome is a death knell for inmate unions of any shape
or form."' The dissent of Justices Marshall and Brennan is directed
at what they perceive as the "apparent fear of a prison reform organization . . . [and] a giant step backwards towards that discredited
conception of prisoners' rights and the role of the courts.""' 7 Specifically, they oppose the distinctive first amendment treatment which
is utilized in isolating the prison from the remainder of society."'
Blind abdication of decision making to the exclusive province of
correctional officials fails to account for their obvious self-interest
in maintaining the status quo and repressing that which would have
the possibility of creating internal unrest. The long term forecast of
the majority opinion results in the inevitable erosion of prisoner
rights wherever the administration is capable of demonstrating
they acted rationally.
The union in Jones was moderate in both its structure and
113. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Rowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th
Cir. 1971); Laaman v. Hancock, 351 F. Supp. 1265 (D.N.H. 1972); Sostre v. Otis, 330 F. Supp.
941 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
114. 97 S. Ct. at 2544.
115. Id.
116. See Survey, note 129 infra.
117. 97 S. Ct. at 2545. Marshall's reference is to the "hands-off" doctrine. For added
discussion see text accompanying notes 13-18 supra.
118. The dissent would prefer to analyze prisoner claims under the same first amendment scrutiny applied in cases where those claiming constitutional protection are not incarcerated. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 299 (1963). But see Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
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goals. Defending human and civil rights, gathering community support for prison reform, providing post-release aid in job hunting, and
advancing economic, political, social and cultural interests were its
primary concerns."' As with the Attica demands, none of the
union's aims could be interpreted as radical, nor would they appear
an imminent threat to prison security. Consequently, the absence
of any analysis of the merits of a prisoner organization from the
Court's opinion'20 detracts from its acceptability. This fault becomes all the more glaring when one recognizes that in other countries successful organizations exist which deal with a full panoply
of prisoner claims and represent a constructive force in the correctional system. 2 '
Both the American Bar Association' and the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals'23 have
devoted attention to the wide spectrum of inmate organizational

activities including freedom of association,12 1 prisoner employment, 25 wages,' 26 and the protection of federal and state labor
laws.'" The organizations are in favor of granting inmates certain
119. See Brief for Appellee at 43.
120. Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion admits a lack of investigation of
prisoner unions. 433 U.S. 119, 137 (1977).
121. Sweden and Denmark are two countries with a long history of prison reform.
KRUM, the Swedish movement, and KRIM, its Danish counterpart, are well organized
groups of ex-inmates, students, and intellectuals. Prisoners have a right to form inmate
grievance commissions which are authorized to communicate with the prison administration
concerning grievances and develop other procedures for inmate involvement in the functioning of the institution. These groups have achieved many of the basic demands of their
American counterparts such as liberal visitation rights, leaves and furloughs. As stated by
the Director General of the National Correctional Administration: "According to Swedish law
there is nothing to prevent the inmates of penal institutions from forming their own organization. The general freedom of association applies to them. Likewise there is nothing to prevent
them from electing bodies within the institution to further their demands." Ward, Inmate
Rights and Prison Reform in Sweden and Denmark, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 240, 244 (1972)
(citing B. Martinsson, Prison Democracy in Sweden, Sweden Informational News Release,
April 16, 1971, at 1). See also R. GOLDFARB, JAILS 409 (1975), in which the Norwegian (KROM)
and Finnish (November Movement) counterparts of Swedish and Danish prisoner reform
organizations are discussed.
122. See ABA STANDARDS on the Legal Status of Prisoners, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377
(1977).
123. See National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, in
COMPENDIUM OF MODERN CORRECTIONAL LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS (2d ed. 1975).
124. ABA STANDARD 6.4 and Commentary, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377, 514-25 (1977);
National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Standard 2.15
(1973) in

COMPENDIUM OF MODERN CORRECTIONAL LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS

(2d ed. 1975).

125. ABA STANDARD 4.1 and Commentary, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377, 458, 460-63 (1977).
126. ABA STANDARD 4.2, 4.4 and Commentary, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377, 458-59, 46364, 465 (1977).
127. ABA STANDARD 4.3 and Commentary, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377, 459, 464-65 (1977);
National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Standard 13.3 in
COMPENDIUM OF MODERN CORRECTIONAL LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS (2d ed. 1975).
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rights and protection in all of the above stated areas. Their belief is
that inmate organizations should be given the opportunity to prove
their worth. If agitation results, the organization could be dealt with
accordingly. Even inmate strikes receive the approval of the ABA
as a method of peaceful protest protected by the first amendment.' 8
In its view, participation in these activities, without more, would
not be grounds for either discipline or sanction. To ignore these
aforementioned considerations is to ignore the reality of a potentially effective force to facilitate change.
If the relatively moderate demands of the union in Jones can
be so easily avoided, then an organization attempting to incorporate
not only prison reform but traditional labor concepts of collective
bargaining, grievance procedures, and binding arbitration can certainly expect absolute opposition.' A labor union connotes power,
128. The prison strike raises different concerns than do strikes in public and private
sectors. In the marketplace, a strike applies economic pressure to the employer whose operation may be stopped or at least slowed to some extent. Moreover, a strike signals a break in
the relationship between employer and employee.'
Prison strikes, by their nature, cannot generate the economic pressure which makes labor
strikes effective tools. Prisoners for the most part do not perform essential services for the
community which cannot be left undone. The production of nonessential products, such as
license plates and manhole covers, does not provide.the needed leverage to force a correctional
system to acquiesce to a particular demand or grievance.
Even in the result of a strike, there can be no split between inmates and correctional
officials. Basic needs, such as food and medical services, must continue to be supplied to the
inmates. Since these services would continue in less than a cordial atmosphere, frustration
and friction on both sides would undoubtedly create a very volatile situation.
Viewed in this perspective, the strike does not present itself as an effective tool in the
penal situation in comparison to its utilization on the outside. For it to be effective in terms
of eliciting demands or concessions, there must be economic pressure exerted. Without economic pressure all that results is antagonism and frustration on the part of the inmates and
fear by correctional administrators for the security of the institution.
It is submitted that the ABA Standards concerning this area, fail to perceive the inevitable hostility which would result. An arbitration procedure would vent the antagonism and
deal with the problem. Moreover, arbitration would provide an alternate method of dispute
resolution and avoid the obvious inadequacies of the prison strike. See Denenberg, Handling
Prison Grievances: The "Labor Model" in Practice, 99 MON. LAB. REv. 53 (Mar. 1977).
129. To determine the actual impact of Jones on existing unions and present and future
organizational attempts, a survey was undertaken consisting of a cover letter and questionnaire which were sent to all fifty states and the District of Columbia. The cover letter
explained the nature of the research being conducted and the importance of a candid response
of each respective department of correction. In 1972 a similar project was undertaken at the
University of Buffalo. See Comment, Labor Unions for Prison Inmates: An Analysis of a
Recent Proposalfor the Organizationof Inmate Labor, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 963 (1972). The
brief questionnaire was designed to elicit both objective data and subjective impressions of
correctional administrators toward inmate unions.
Forty-three states, or 84%, completed at least portions of the survey. The general response to the questions emphasized an absolute lack of enthusiasm toward dealing with
inmate unions. However, the number of states having actual experience with inmate organizations constituted only a portion of those indicating their aversion toward them. Neverthe-
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pressure and an uneasy relationship as far as prison administrators
are concerned. At its most basic level, it gives the union an equal
voice in bargaining with the administration. This is epecially true
if there were present a specified grievance procedure leading to arbitration for those problem areas which remain unresolved.' 30 An
less, those who had such experience reaffirmed the fear that such organizations represent a
security threat to the institution, are a cause of violence, and do not work as a stabilizing
force to curb disorder.
Most of the states were familiar with the Jones decision and its holding. Two states had
misconstrued the decision as a strict prohibition against any form of inmate union. Initially,
the pollsters had expected that more states would interpret Jones in this manner, perhaps a
self-serving analysis. One effect of the decision may be the uninhibited responses to the
questionnaire from correctional administrators. They freely voiced their approval of the Supreme Court opinion and its concurrence with their own internal policies.
Comments of the administrators foresaw a decrease in the trend towards organizing these
types of groups. Organized inmate action would be neutralized and curtailed. Many of the
administrators justified their position by pointing out that there were alternative internal
procedures through which prisoners could register displeasure with official policy. In some
prisons various inmate advisory groups could act as the spokespersons for the inmate population; in others, prison ombudsmen were an institutional avenue of redress. The significant
aspect of this is the importance placed on the advisory nature of all these different representative groups. The advisory capacity through which they serve has no official authority or power
beyond that which the administration allows. The lack of official authority provides the
principal distinction from an inmate union which possesses inherent power to aid in decision
making.
Since Rhode Island was the only participating state to indicate that it had an inmate
union operating within the correctional system, its response was of particular interest. According to officials, the limited purpose of the union is to bring about prison reform. There is
no bargaining between the respective parties. The existence of unions was not noted as having
either a stabilizing or disruptive effect. The Department of Correction further commented
that upon completion of a dispute resolution system currently being developed by the American Arbitration Association a decision will be made on the feasibility of allowing an inmate
union to continue. This comment is rather revealing because it might be a harbinger of the
removal of unions in Rhode Island. One other state which asked that its identity be kept
confidential indicated its allowance of inmate unions, but currently has none operating there.
One set of answers was especially responsive to all questions and can be used to summarize the prevalent feeling today among correctional authorities:
This decision [Jones/ will allow prison officials to understand clearly their authority with respect to placing limitations on the goals and method of inmate
groups and organization. I see this decision as an uncharacteristically clear pronouncement by the court in an area where their [sic] decisions are usually vague
or unrealistic. . . . The recognition that prison administrators may exercise discretion in permitting the formation of group activity clearly aids the officials in
keeping order within the institution. No good can come from placing inmates in
adversary roles against prison officials. This is what a prisoner's union, or a
similar group, by whatever name it may be called, would result in.
Response from Sue Rouprich, Attorney for the Secretary of Correction, Louisiana Department
of Correction.
130. It has been suggested that the arbitration model that has proven successful in the
labor field could be modified to fit the penal context. Successful implementation of a model
of this type would necessitate the independent existence of a dispute resolution system, free
from political commitments and distinct from the administration. Any other structure would
likely evoke suspicion from the inmates. Independence could be achieved if groups such as
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equal voice signifies the introduction of a degree of credibility into
the correctional relationship. Direct negotiation, however, defies the
customary correctional philosophy aimed at submissiveness. Authorities find it difficult to deal with inmates who are argumentative

in seeking their objectives, Because of this, inmate selection of representatives, and bargaining rather than advising are particularly

grating and distasteful to most correction officials.' This entrenched behavior on the part of some correctional officials is as
detrimental to the legitimate interests of all parties as the alleged
harmful effects of concerted activity by inmates.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The significance of the Jones decision is both interesting and
unusual because it transcends seemingly divergent areas of the law.
Confined to the subject of prisoner rights, the opinion makes evident
that a highwater mark has been reached. Thus, Jones marks a continuing recession of the movement to extend prisoner rights. By
permitting broad discretion on the part of correctional authorities,
future attempts at inmate organization will likely meet unflinching
resistance.'32
Refusing to allow this type of concerted activity will undoubtedly hinder further advancement of prisoner rights. This may necessitate a return to individual action which lacks the force and intensity of group action. In essence, the Court has accomplished a subtle
return to the hands-off doctrine by its relegation of prison administration almost exclusively to correctional administrators.
the Center for Correctional Justice, National Center for Dispute Resolution, or the American
Arbitration Association set up and developed a negotiating structure and provided assistance
in its implementation.
Quick response to inmate grievances would also be a vital function if the system were to
prove workable. Thus, specific grievance procedures and time limits would have to be established and enforced. Immediate attention to problems would avoid criticism of a do-nothing
attitude, which is all too often the hallmark of a bureaucracy. Finally, if the arbitrator's
decision is to be of real value, it must be final and binding on the parties.
Creation of the system would call for the selection of appropriate bargaining units for
the administration and inmates, neutrally maintained election procedures to select the proper
representatives, a definition of the subjects available for discussion, and rules guiding them.
For a comprehensive discussion of the arbitration model see Coulson, Justice Behind Bars:
Time to Arbitrate, 59 A.B.A.J. 612 (1973). Cf. United Steel Workers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). These cases
have become known as the "Steelworkers Trilogy," and detail the significance of arbitration
in labor law.
131. See Lesnick, Grievance Procedures in FederalPrisons:Practicesand Proposals, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 31, 31-32 (1974). See Survey at note 129 supra. But see P. KEvE, PRISON LIFE
AND HUMAN WORTH (1974).
132. See Survey at note 129 supra.
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AN APPRAISAL OF PRISONER RIGHTS

The recurrent theme of the recent decisions of the Court is that
"prison officials must be accorded latitude.' 33 This language, cited
on numerous occasions, has now been elevated to a point where
courts will ordinarily defer to the expert judgment of correctional
officials on matters of penal policy.
Extensive criticism of the hands-off doctrine may be unwarranted. There is an acknowledged need for certain flexibility on the
part of the correctional administrator who is trained to confront the
everyday problems inside the prison and determine the most appropriate way to facilitate their handling. Any further relinquishment
of judicial scrutiny would not serve the best interests of any of the
parties involved and may well be a dangerous path to follow.
The pattern of the Court's treatment of the inmate union highlights what is increasingly becoming known as the "decline of unionization.'' While forty percent of the American labor force was
unionized thirty years ago, today only twenty-five percent is comprised of union members. Although union membership continues to
increase in the public sector, it is encountering formidable resistance from both the taxpayers and public service employers. It remains questionable whether public service unions can retain recent
gains of job security and retirement pay in view of the current economic situation. The decline in union strength can also be measured
by the erosion of union leadership through its reluctance to infuse
new blood into the old guard. These deficiencies have been increasingly evident by labor's importance in wielding political clout with
Congress in helping to enact legislation favorable to labor's viewpoint. It may now be that the most telling blow to labor's image has
been delivered by its onetime advocate, the public. Recent public
opinion polls have found less public trust in labor than in any other
institution.'35

In the final analysis, if rehabilitation is an actual goal of the
penal system, a hybrid union, at the very least, deserves the opportunity to establish its credentials or lack thereof in the correctional
setting. It does not have to do so with the full accompaniment of
rights, privileges, and economic weapons of the private and public
sectors. To simply shun the possible existence of beneficial features
of the inmate union without carefully drawn conclusions, not only
impugns the judicial integrity of the bench, but neglects an alternative form of improving the prison environment and expediting dispute resolution within the system.
133. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972).
134. Drucker, The Decline of Unionization, Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1977, at 24, col. 4.
135. Id.

